对抗强势美元
现在的中国，如果想要避免经济硬着陆，必须进行大规模的改革，这是和时间进行赛跑，必须在强势美元来临之际，重新塑造人们对政府的信心、消除掉资产泡沫等，而这一切又会受到很大的阻力，政府权力具体体现在每个受益者身上，没有几个人愿意革掉自己的权力，那怕死后洪水滔天。
先发一些基本观点，因为要写成文章，还需要对素材进行整理。
遏制社会财富失血
对权贵资产合法化。
像大家熟悉的红色后代，都可计入其中。在当今“权力统吃一切”的社会中，他们手握重权，占据着社会大量的财富。在这种大背景下，我个人强烈建议对他们的财产合法化，这总比转移到海外要好，一方面减弱改革对他们权力的限制带来的不安全感，另一方面也减弱改革的阻力，是一个双赢的局面。
大赦经济领域犯罪
这包括对像许宗衡这种体制内贪法腐败的官员、像黄光裕这种早期有原罪的商人、像吴英这种从事民间借贷等所有涉及经济犯罪的人们进行赦免，就如同香港廉政公署为了治理香港严重的腐败实行的“新老划断”政策。在司法不独立的情况下，体制内的个体为了生存必须结合成利益集团来对抗不同的利益集团，不进行大敕，公权力就很难被关进笼子里，甚至还会咬伤行动的人民。中国现下欠缺的是一个好的体制，而不是一个能够使好人变坏的大染缸，在我看来，这同样是一个双赢的局面。
以上两点主要是为了减少因为没有安全感而进行的大规模移民。近些年“移民”在中国已经成为了潮流，据统计仅2010年每1万人移出有3.4人。
以前央行发布过一个报告称贪官外逃金额有8千亿，后来被辟谣。
而最近的一个大案，某家庭拥有几十亿美元的海外资产。所以我的观点虽然不被很多人接受，但请你们理解。
3.叫停A股IPO
在股市未实现有效的改革之前，比如审批制度改革、实现法治等，叫停股市的IPO，特别是国企IPO，尤其像人民网这种类型。
@slumdog1016 2012-04-26 18:52:21
LZ的帖子绝对让我受益匪浅，对LZ表示衷心感谢！！！！！和绝对的佩服！！！！！像LZ这样的人才称得上纯正的有良知的精英！！！！
并且我完完全全同意LZ的观点，绝对看衰国内经济。可是我有一点不明白，为什么LZ能把C国的经济存在的问题以及经济前景分析的如此透彻清晰，而ZF却一直在脚踩西瓜皮，河里头乱摸石头，把个C国搞成现在这个样子，放着阳关道不走，却偏要搬石头砸自己的脚。这是为什么！！！想到这.....
-----------------------------
不知道啥基金不好分析，对美国股市不是很了解。
我有几个年长许多的哥们在体制内，我还能经常揩揩油，比如喝喝酒，拿拿他们开会时送的衬衣什么的玩意，何况那些手握权力者，谁愿意去改革？改革有风险，弄不好身败名裂，这现状多好了，集体负责，都不负责。
发篇以前看过的一片BLOG，原刊于FT英文网站。
Guest post China’s disappearing Rmb1,100bn bank deposits beyondbrics News and views on emerging markets from the Financial Times
By Victor Shih of Northwestern University
In July this year, households and companies withdrew a total of Rmb1,100bn ($172.5bn) from China’s banks, equivalent to 2.5 per cent of GDP. In August, household deposits barely clinged to positive territory at Rmb26bn, despite receiving over Rmb188bn in new loans that month.
Corporate deposits grew a bit more, but were still abnormally low. Although the September numbers are not out yet, Chinese press reports suggest that the deposits in the major state banks declined substantially in the first half of the month. Where did all the money go?
The emerging consensus is that household deposits went to wealth management products (WMPs) to finance corporations. This makes great sense because households currently face over negative 3 per cent in real interest rates on their deposits, so they have high motivation to reallocate funds to WMPs, which offer higher yields.
If that were the case, though, we would see spikes in firm deposits, but we do not. In August, for example, corporate deposits increased by Rmb371bn, but nearly all of that can be accounted for by the Rmb360bn in new corporate loans. Funds provided by WMPs did not seem to play a role in boosting corporate deposits.
At the very least, we need to account for the Rmb188bn in new loans received by households in August, which did not show up as household deposits. If they used that money to pay companies, then companies should have seen an even higher increase in new deposits. But we don’t see that.
To be sure, government deposits rose by Rmb101bn in August, but again, even if all or most of the Rmb188bn in new loans to households went to pay taxes directly or indirectly, we are still left with Rmb88bn unaccounted for.
In all likelihood, much of the taxes was paid by corporations, so the disappearing household deposits remain largely a mystery.
The disappearance of funds is especially puzzling when we consider that China yet again ran a trade surplus in August ($17bn), which should have pumped Rmb107bn into the system.
Moreover, the PBoC redeemed a total of Rmb163bn in notes to inject liquidity into the system in August. There has also been no further increase in reserve requirement because the new reserve requirement for margin deposits did not apply until September for some banks.
Of course, some people will say that the money is just off-balance sheets, but held in a dark pool of “other assets” in banks. Again, this doesn’t make much sense to me because the supposed goal of WMPs is to finance company spending. Thus, if the money ends up in a company’s account or if the recipient pays another company, we should see a spike in corporate deposits.
Finally, another possibility is that funds have left China altogether, causing an absolute decline in bank deposits. To be sure, this does not seem to be the case at the moment because official bank statistics still show an increase in position in foreign exchange purchase in both July and August, suggesting that banks in China changed more dollars into renminbi than the other way around.
One loophole that has opened recently is that Chinese importers now can pay offshore suppliers using onshore RMB. Where legitimate current account transactions can take place, investors can also use it to move money overseas. So far this year, RMB trade settlement through Hong Kong has exceeded Rmb1,000bn.
If import settlement through Hong Kong was taking place on a large enough scale, substantial amount of onshore deposits may leave China without showing up in the net foreign exchange purchase number, which only reflects onshore exchange of currencies. Of course, even this loophole does not explain the spectacular decline in deposits in recent months.
Although the mystery remains unsolved for the moment, solving the mystery is important for investors who want a sense of where the economy is heading.
If large sums are indeed disappearing into the shadow banking system, then a rapidly rising share of the financial system is beyond the direct control of the government.
If large sums are indeed flowing out of China, we may have the beginning of major, sustained outflows from China.
Victor Shih is associate professor of political science at Northwestern University. You can follow him on Twitter at @vshih2
核心提示：今年七月，從數字上來看，中國的存款金額減少了11000億人民幣。作者分析了造成這一數字變化的多種可能性。排除一些不能自圓其說的可能之後，作者問：中國是否存在一個規模巨大的“影子銀行”或是拉開了存款外逃的序幕？
原文：Guest post: China's disappearing Rmb1,100bn bank deposits
作者：Victor Shih（美國西北大學）
發表：2011年10月7日
本文由“譯者”志願者翻譯并校對
今年七月，家庭以及企業客戶總計從中國的銀行提取了11, 000 億人民幣的存款（1725億美元），相當於GDP的2.5%。到了八月，儘管獲得了1880億的新貸款，家庭客戶的存款額卻僅僅回升至260億人民幣。
企業客戶的存款額增長的要明顯一些，但仍然低得不正常。雖然九月的數據還未出爐，中國媒體報導已經預測主要國有銀行的存款會在九月的上半月大幅減少。那些存款都去哪裡了？
越來越多人認同的一個看法是，家庭存款轉移到了財富管理項目上（WMPs），這些項目又向公司提供融資。這說法不無道理。畢竟，當家庭客戶存款的實際利率比-3%還低的時候，他們有較強的動機把存款轉移到有較高回報的財富管理項目上。
但假如真是這樣，公司存款應該大幅增加才是。但種情況沒有發生。舉個例子，在八月的時候，企業的存款增加了3710億人民幣，但這幾乎就是新增加的3600億人民幣的企業貸款的總數。財富管理項目提供的資金對增加企業存款的作用看來是零。
最低限度來說，我們還得把八月份貸給家庭客戶的、沒有化為存款的1880億人民幣新增貸款計算在內。假如這些錢是用來償還給公司的話，企業的存款額理應大大增加。可是我們沒有看到這一現象。
說得確切些，政府的存款在八月增加了1010億人民幣。但即使發給家庭的1880億人民幣新貸款被全數用來直接或間接的納稅，依然有880億人民幣不知去向。
毫無疑問，大多數的稅款都是企業繳納的。因而不翼而飛的家庭存款依然是個謎。
考慮到中國在八月份再次錄得貿易盈餘（170億人民幣），而銀行體系的資金應該增加1070億人民幣的時候，這些款項的消失更令人摸不著頭腦。
再者，中國人民銀行在八月總共兌現了1630億人民幣，給銀行體系注入資金。而銀行存款的準備金額並沒有上調，一些銀行的保證金存款準備金額新規定要在九月才生效。
當然，有人會說那些錢不過是從賬面消失，並被納入到銀行中其他資產的黑池而已。這也是說不通的，因為財富管理項目的目的就是支付企業的開支。所以，假如款項最終落入公司的帳戶，又或者收款者把款項付給另一家公司，企業的存款額應該有所增加。
最後，另一個可能性就是這些款項完全離開了中國，因而引致銀行存款絕對的減少。毋庸置疑的是目前的情況看來並不是如此。官方的銀行數據在七月和八月的外匯購買依然錄得增幅，顯示中國把更多的美元轉換成人民幣，而不是相反。
一個最近出現的漏洞是，中國的進口商可以用境內的人民幣繳付給境外的供應商。而只要是可以合法地進行經常賬戶交易的地方，投資者也可以把金錢轉移到海外。今年到現在為止，通過香港進行的人民幣進口結算交易金額已經超過10,000億人民幣。
假如通過香港進行的進口結算規模夠大的話，大量的境內存款便有可能離開中國，而不會對只會反映境內貨幣兌換的淨外匯購買數額構成變化。當然，即使是這個漏洞也不能說明在最近幾個月的存款顯著下降的原因。
謎團雖然仍未解開，但揭開這個謎對想要知道經濟前景的投資者而言是重要的。
假如大額款項正在移到影子銀行體系，那麼一個不受政府控制的金融系統所佔的市場份額便會急升。
假如大額的款項正在流出中國，這可能就是中國大規模而且持久的資金外移的序幕。
声明：本人未写任何书，也没推销任何股票，此贴中所有的广告与我无关。